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FAIR USE AND APPROPRIATION ART

(d) 0.5% for the portion of the sale from
€350,000.01 to €500,000;

NIELS SCHAUMANN†

(e) 0.25% for the portion of the sale price
exceeding €500,000.67
In 2013, Société des Auteurs Dans les Arts
Graphiques et Plastiques (ADAGP), the French
collecting society for visual artists, distributed royalties
to 1840 artists and their estates—44% were living
artists.68 The French law extends the resale royalty to
seventy years after the artist’s death.69 ADAGP collected
over €12.5 million in resale royalties: €8.3 million from
sales in France and the rest from foreign markets.70
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, I wrote an article 1 on the treatment of
appropriation artists2 under the Copyright Act of 1976
(the Act).3 The thrust of the article was that copyright
law was suppressing appropriation art. 4 This was
happening because the Act did not recognize the
circumstances of the late twentieth century, when a
significant chunk of the aesthetic vocabulary of the day
was privately owned. 5 Many artists were targeting
popular culture, but that was becoming difficult to do
when most of that culture was owned by litigious
cultural landlords who stood ready to bring copyright
infringement actions against anyone using their
“property.” The article predicted that appropriation
artists would “abandon their art” if some solution was
not devised.6 The article provided one such solution 7 in
the form of a narrowly tailored copyright privilege
extending to the creation of “works of visual art” as
defined in the Copyright Act—works of painting or
sculpture that are created in single copies or editions of
not more than 200.8
My earlier article was written seventeen years ago.
In this article, I will revisit the circumstances of

1
Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist’s Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
249 (1997).
2
“Appropriation in art and art history refers to the practice of artists
using pre-existing objects or images in their art with little transformation of
the original.” Appropriation, TATE, http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/onlineresources/glossary/a/appropriation (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
3
See Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law (Copyright Act
of 1976), ch. 17, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
4
Schaumann, supra note 1, at 249–51.
5
Id. at 252–54.
6
Id. at 273.
7
See id. at 274–80.
8
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art”).
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appropriation subject artists to see how the law has
evolved and whether they are freer to create than they
were in the late 1990s. In particular, although the
Supreme Court in 1994 clearly sent a signal that
“transformation” of the copied work would be
important in fair use cases, 9 this idea had not been
applied to appropriation art cases. How, then, has
“transformation” affected appropriation art? Does
appropriation art still pose a challenge to copyright law?
Although I will build on my earlier article, I will not
assume familiarity with it. This article stands on its own.
Whereas An Artist’s Privilege investigated a number of
different alternatives to the treatment of appropriation
art under the Copyright Act, the current article looks
only at the changes in the fair use doctrine and
discusses whether those changes would suffice to make
a privilege like the one suggested in the earlier article
unnecessary.
Part I provides some background regarding
aesthetic vocabulary in the arts, and traces the use of
appropriated images in the twentieth- and twenty-first
centuries. Part II discusses the general application of
copyright law to appropriation art. Part III examines the
current status of the fair use cases that address
appropriation art and concludes that the fair use results
are better than before, largely because of the
ascendancy of “transformativeness” as an important fair
use factor. It also concludes, however, that fair use
remains insufficient to protect appropriation art.
Finally, Part IV re-proposes a solution—an exception to
copyright, limited to fine art—grounded in the public
benefit of dissemination of knowledge and the lack of
damage to the original author’s economic interest
resulting from appropriation art.
9

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
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Aesthetic vocabulary changes with the times.
Voluptuous female nudes are no longer a common
subject of painters; neither are religious allegories. Art
today is more openly critical of the culture in which it
arises, and it does so in many cases by referring
explicitly to that culture. This section will briefly review
the history of appropriation as an artistic technique.10
The art historian will no doubt see this as woefully
inadequate, but for legal purposes it will suffice.

Chinese gazelle. 13 Soon, however, artists began to
appropriate the works of other artists as subject matter,
rather than pre-existing utilitarian objects. In 1938,
Joseph Cornell—who had become infatuated with the
actress Rose Hobart—purchased a print of the B-movie
East of Borneo featuring the actress, removed all the
sections of the film in which she did not appear, and
projected what was left at silent-film speed through a
blue-tinted lens with a new soundtrack from a record
album he had purchased. He called this work Rose
Hobart.14

Beginning in the early twentieth century, artists
began to take objects from their surroundings for
incorporation into works of art, for example the
collages of Picasso and Braques. 11 These collages were
followed by the use of industrially-manufactured
objects that were complete, stood alone, and were
identified as art. Marcel Duchamp’s “ready-mades”
famously included a piece titled “Fountain,” consisting
of a men’s urinal atop a pedestal, signed “R. Mutt 1917.” 12

Twenty years later, more film works were
appropriated. The year 1958 saw two works that
consisted of appropriated images: A Movie, by Bruce
Connor,15 and the film Cowboy and Indian, by Raphael
Montanez Ortiz. 16 Connor’s film used found footage
and pre-recorded sounds to present a meditation on
sex, war, and the nature of the film medium. 17 Ortiz cut
apart footage from a Western film, threw the cut-up
pieces in a bag, and then randomly pulled out pieces of

II. AESTHETIC VOCABULARY

The use of objects from the environment was
continued by the Surrealists. Meret Oppenheim’s Object
is a cup, saucer, and spoon—covered in the fur of a

10
A similarly brief exposition of this subject can be found on the Tate
Gallery web site. TATE, supra note 2.
11
Both artists were responsible for introducing collages, or papiers collés,
into fine art in 1912. Pablo Picasso used newspaper clippings to create
forms. See, for example, Bottle of Vieux Marc, Glass, Guitar, and Newspaper,
which may be viewed at Tate online. Pablo Picasso, Bottle of Vieux Marc,
Glass,
Guitar,
and
Newspaper,
TATE,
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/picasso-bottle-of-vieux-marc-glassguitar-and-newspaper-t00414 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
12
Shelley Esaak, Special Exhibition Gallery: Dada at MoMA—New
ABOUT EDUCATION (2014), available at
York,
http://arthistory.about.com/od/dada/ig/DadaatMoMANewYork/dada
_newyork_07.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2014)(showing an original
photograph of the work taken by Alfred Stieglitz).

13
An image of this work, and its gallery label text, are available at the
Museum of Modern Art website. Meret Oppenheim, Object, MUSEUM OF
MODERN
ART,
http://www.moma.org/collection/object.php?object_id=80997 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2014).
14
Vivian Sobchak, Nostalgia for a Digital Object: Regrets on the
Quickening of QuickTime, Nordicom Review 29, 37 (2004), available at
http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/134_029038.pdf. The film Rose Hobart is available on YouTube. Joseph Cornell,
Rose
Hobart,
YouTube
(July
15,
2012)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQxtZlQlTDA.
15
David Conner Haney, Documentary, Postmodernism, and La Mémoire des
(July
2011)
anges,
OFFSCREEN
http://offscreen.com/view/documentary_postmodernism.
16
Rocío Aranda-Alvarado, Unmaking: The Work of Raphael Montañez
CITY
MUSEUM,
(Feb.-Aug.
2007),
Ortiz,
JERSEY
http://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/Interview%20with%20O
rtiz.pdf.
17
Haney, supra note 15.

[6:121 2015]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW REVIEW

126

the film and spliced the parts together to create a new
work.18
In the 1960s, the Pop Art movement began to
appropriate images from popular culture. Roy
Lichtenstein’s Look Mickey, 19 painted in 1961, takes an
image from a Little Golden Book featuring Donald
Duck.20 Later, Lichtenstein painted images in his comicbook style based on paintings by Picasso. 21 Picasso, too,
appropriated: in 1957, he painted his Las Meninas
series—a suite of fifty-eight paintings reinterpreting Las
Meninas by Diego Velazquez.22
The 1960s also brought Pop Art icon Andy Warhol,
whose silkscreened images of flowers on the walls of
Leo Castelli’s gallery generated what might be the first

18

Aranda-Alvarado, supra note 16, at 33.
19
An image of the painting appears at the National Gallery of Art
website. Roy Lichtenstein, Look Mickey, NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART,
http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/Collection/art-object-page.71479.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
20
An image of the painting may be viewed in the public domain. CARL
BUETTNER, DONALD DUCK LOST AND FOUND (1960), available at
http://www.nga.gov/content/dam/ngaweb/Education/learningresources/an-eye-for-art/AnEyeforArt-RoyLichtenstein.pdf.
21
An image of one of the paintings may be viewed at Christie’s website.
Roy
Lichtenstein,
Woman
with
Flowered
Hat,
CHRISTIE’S
http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/paintings/roy-lichtenstein-womanwith-flowered-hat-5684070-details.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). This
painting sold for more than $56 million at Christie’s in May 2013. The
Picasso original, which sold for more than $95 million in 2006, can be
viewed on Wikipedia. Pablo Picasso, Dora Maar au Chat, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dora_Maar_au_Chat (last visited Nov. 3,
2014).
22
These
paintings
may
be
viewed
at
BCN.CAT,
http://www.bcn.cat/museupicasso/swf/en/lacoleccio/meninas/meninas.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 3, 2014); Diego Velazquez, Las Meninas-Picasso, LAS
MENINAS, http://www.velazquezlasmeninas.com/las-meninas-picasso.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
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lawsuit based on artistic appropriation. 23 Even Roy
Lichtenstein’s appropriation of Disney characters, noted
above, did not provoke a lawsuit. The case against
Warhol was settled out of court, with Warhol agreeing
to a royalty for future uses of Caulfield’s work. 24 Warhol
also gave Caulfield two of the silkscreened flower
pieces.25
At the same time, Elaine Sturtevant was copying the
works of other artists, meticulously reproducing the
technique and results obtained by others. It is
frequently difficult to spot a Sturtevant; her works are
superb repetitions of the works of others. 26 When
questioned intensively about his own technique,
Warhol reportedly said, “I don’t know. Ask Elaine.” 27
Sturtevant herself summed up her purpose by saying, “I
create vertigo.” 28 Although she was creating since the
23
Warhol was sued by Patricia Caulfield, whose copyrighted
photograph of four poppies Warhol found in an issue of Modern
Photography. Warhol enlarged the image and had it professionally silkscreened onto canvases that were then painted in bright, often unrealistic
colors by Warhol's friends and associates at his studio, “the Factory.” The
resulting series of approximately 1,000 works, entitled Flowers, were shown
in the Leo Castelli gallery and eventually licensed as posters. Caulfield
discovered Warhol's unauthorized use when she came across the posters in
a New York City bookstore. One of Warhol's biographers claims that
Caulfield was not concerned about the infringement to her work, but rather
that she “had been prompted to sue him when she heard that Andy was
‘rich.’” Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic
Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 225–26 (2007).
24
Id. at 226.
25
Id.
26
See Andrew Russeth, Sturtevant, Uncompromising Progenitor of
Appropriation Art, Has Died, N. Y. OBSERVER (May 7, 2014, 9:43 PM),
http://observer.com/2014/05/sturtevant-uncompromising-progenitor-ofappropriation-has-died/.
27
Margalit Fox, Elaine Sturtevant, Who Borrowed Others’ Work Artfully, Is
TIMES,
May
16,
2014,
available
at
Dead
at
89,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/arts/design/elaine-sturtevantappropriation-artist-is-dead-at-89.html.
28
Id.
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1960s, Sturtevant, unlike Warhol, was not sued for
copying others’ works, although she reportedly
annoyed Claes Oldenburg severely when she copied his
Store.29
By 1975, Richard Prince was re-photographing
images taken from cigarette advertisements, 30 the
beginning of a career of appropriation that by 2012 had
extended to a complete appropriation of the novel The
Catcher in the Rye, identical in every way to the original
first edition, except that the author’s name had been
changed from J.D. Salinger to Richard Prince. 31 Along
the way, Prince created the works shown in his Canal
Zone exhibition, which prompted a lawsuit from
photographer Patrick Cariou, thirty-five of whose
photographs were used in Prince’s exhibition. 32
The 1980s saw the adoption of the term
“appropriation art” in the art world. 33 Sherrie Levine
photographed the work of other photographers (while
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scrupulously
identifying
the
originals
and
distinguishing them from her own work).34 Jeff Koons
took images from popular culture, recreating them in
sculpture, painting, and collage. 35 He was sued for
copyright infringement three times in the late 1980s,
and lost each case. 36 In 2006, Koons finally won a case,
based on his “transformation” of the appropriated
work.37
The foregoing short history demonstrates that the
practice of appropriating objects and images from the
world surrounding the artist has a distinguished and
lengthy pedigree. So common is appropriation in the
art world that a 2010 exhibition at the New Museum in
New York, entitled Free, was built “partly around the
very idea of the borrowing culture.” 38 Nevertheless,
beginning in 1965 with the lawsuit against Andy
Warhol, 39 copyright infringement cases against artists
who reuse images have proliferated.

29

Christopher Bagley, Sturtevant: Repeat Offender, W (May 8, 2014, 8:12
PM),
http://www.wmagazine.com/people/2014/05/sturtevant-momaretrospective/photos/.
30
One example from 1989 can be seen at the Metropolitan Museum of
Art. THOMAS P. CAMPBELL, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM ART GUIDE 448
(Michael Sittenfeld & Robert Weisberg ed., 2012), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=3C4AFXFLmZEC (last visited Nov. 2,
2014);
Richard
Prince,
Untitled
(Cowboy),
METMUSEUM,
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/2000.272 (last visited Nov.
2, 2014).
31
Kenneth Goldsmith, Richard Prince’s Latest Act of Appropriation: The
Catcher in the Rye,
POETRY FOUNDATION
(Apr.
19,
2012),
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2012/04/richard-princes-latestact-of-appropriation-the-catcher-in-the-rye/.
32
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 618, (2013).
33
See TATE, supra note 2; Sven Lütticken, The Feathers of the Eagle, 36
NEW
LEFT
REV.
109,
109
(2005),
available
at
http://dspace.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/21431/182536.pdf?sequence
=2.

34
See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 250; see also John Carlin, Culture
Vultures: Artistic Appropriate and Intellectual Property Law Review, 13 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 103–04 (1988); Gerald Marzorati, Art in the (Re)making,
ARTNEWS, May 1986, at 90, 97. “Copying such images, whether or not for
artistic purposes, is likely to result in litigation.” Schaumann, supra note 1, at
254; see, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y 1993); Campbell v.
Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993).
35
See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 251; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304–306.
36
See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 301; United Feature Syndicate, Inc, 817 F.
Supp. at 370; Campbell, 1993 WL 97381, at *1.
37
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the
ground that Koons's appropriation of Blanch's photograph was fair use).
38
Randy Kennedy, Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at
AR1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/arts/design/richardprince-lawsuit-focuses-on-limits-of-appropriation.html?pagewanted=all.
39
See supra notes 23–25.
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III. COPYRIGHT LAW AND APPROPRIATION ART
It is the nature of appropriation art that the subject
matter is copied. 40 When that subject matter is a
copyrighted work, the artist commits at least one
infringement under the Copyright Act, and likely
more.41 This is not something exclusive to the 1976 Act,
as the (pre-1976) lawsuit against Andy Warhol noted
above makes clear. However, after the Act became
effective on January 1, 1978, a new copyright regime
took hold. The 1976 Act attempted, as nearly as possible,
to fully allocate the right to engage in every feasible use of
a copyrighted work to the owner. 42 Under this scheme,
exceptions were narrowly drawn to serve the interests
of existing users.43 There were few gray areas, and the
only way in which a user might legally use a
copyrighted work without permission was under the
fair use doctrine, codified for the first time in section
107 of the new Act.44
Just a few years after the new Act became effective,
artists were continuing and extending the tradition of
copying from pre-existing works. By the 1980s, the
term “appropriation art” came into use and while the art
was visually similar to the earlier varieties of copied art,
the context and culture were different. The innocence
and playfulness of the earlier copying seemed no longer
to exist: appropriation art had become edgy, self-

40

TATE, supra note 2.
At a minimum, they violate the Act’s prohibition against unlawful
copying. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). In addition, many appropriation art cases
include the use of a work as part of the later artist’s work, as well as the
public display of the work, implicating 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2) and 106(5). See
generally Schaumann, supra note 1, at 254–56 nn.19–24.
42
See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 37 (Prometheus Books,
2006).
43
Id.
44
17 U.S.C. § 107.
41

131

FAIR USE AND APPROPRIATION ART

[6:121 2015]

conscious, and it seemed (sometimes, at least)
knowingly to infringe copyright. Consider the Jeff
Koons’s 1988 Banality show: the title of the show
identifies the subjects as banal, which is to say, lacking
utterly in originality. Copyright, of course, protects
only original works of authorship. Yet, the artist’s copies
of the banal works of others were held to infringe
copyright. 45 Koons’s infringing works were different
from Roy Lichtenstein’s Look Mickey, which retains a
genuine innocence despite copying Disney characters.
When Koons copied cartoon characters, they were
implicated in sexual activities. 46 The controversy this
generated was hardly accidental: Koons’s Made In
Heaven show, following immediately in the footsteps of
the Banality show, contained many works that
graphically depict Koons and his then-wife, porn star
Ilona Staller, having sex.47
Sherrie
Levine
was
another
conspicuously
transgressive artist who became known in the 1980s.
Her 1980 show, After Walker Evans, featured works she
created by re-photographing catalog images out of a
Walker Evans exhibition catalog. She exhibited these
photographs as her own art. 48 While Jeff Koons was

45
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v.
Koons, 91 CIV. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 1, 1993).
46
See, for example, the artist’s description of his work entitled “Pink
Panther,” as quoted in a 1992 Taschen Books retrospective of Koons’s work:
“Pink Panther is about masturbation.” ECKHARD SCHNEIDER ET AL., JEFF
KOONS 113 (Angelika Muthesius ed.) (1992).
47
See id. at 124–61; see also Tom Leonard, Porn star La Cicciolina sues exhusband Jeff Koons for child support, THE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 27, 2008 available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1583034/Porn-star-LaCicciolina-sues-ex-husband-Jeff-Koons-for-child-support.html. Although
the Made in Heaven works were controversial, they were not alleged to
appropriate from other images or to infringe copyright.
48
See
Biography:
Sherry
Levine,
ARTNET,
http://www.artnet.com/artists/sherrie-levine/biography (last visited Oct. 28,
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sued several times, Levine was merely threatened with a
lawsuit. Eventually, the Walker Evans estate simply
bought Levine’s works and declined to exhibit them. 49
When I wrote my 1997 article, Koons and Levine
were the two artists I chose to represent appropriation
art. Since then, however, appropriation has become
more, not less, common. Many other artists are copying
in order to make their artistic statements. The
Wikipedia entry for “appropriation art” includes a list of
“notable” artists using appropriation techniques; the list
contains a hundred names.50
The fact that there are a hundred or more artists
who practice appropriation can mean different things
to different readers. Some might take it as a sign that
copyright law is irrelevant to the actions of artists, who
don’t care about copyright if their chosen means of
expressions leads them toward infringement. Others
might say the fact that only a hundred artists have been
brave enough to face litigation (out of all the artists in
the world) is evidence that copyright has chilled artistic
expression.

2014). However, the title of the show indicates the provenance of the
images. Her practice of signifying appropriated subjects by using the word
“After” in the title has continued throughout her career. Some of her other
artworks based on appropriation include After Miro; Equivalents: After
Stieglitz 1-18; After August Sander; and others. See Artworks: Sherry Levine,
ARTNET, (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). Levine’s work questions traditional
concepts of originality: where is originality, in a photograph (by Levine) of a
photograph (by the catalog photographer) of a photograph of people
posing (by Walker Evans)? In other words, each of the photographers
created an image of something that already existed, either in nature or in
someone else’s photograph. Why are some of these images “original” and
others not?
49
See id.
50
Appropriation
(art),
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appropriation (art) (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
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While the actions of artists may be ambiguous, the
purpose of copyright is not. It is stated in the
Constitution: “To promote the progress of Science . . .
.” 51 The term “Progress of Science” is used in its
eighteenth-century sense, meaning the dissemination
or spread of knowledge.52 Copyright accomplishes this
purpose “by securing for limited Times to Authors . . .
the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings . . . .”53 Restated,
then, copyright exists to further the dissemination of
knowledge, and it does so by providing authors with
exclusive rights in their original works of authorship.
Note, however, that the primary purpose (to
disseminate knowledge) can easily be at odds with the
secondary purpose (to secure rights to authors). The
conflict arises because securing rights to authors limits
dissemination; the requirement of obtaining (and often
paying for) the right to do something with the author’s
work implies that such rights will be exercised less often
than if no permission or payment were required.
In the absence of any provision expressly exempting
art from copyright law, how is the tension between the
primary and secondary purposes of copyright to be
resolved in the case of appropriation art? The usual
crucible in which such outcomes are forged is litigation
under the fair use doctrine. In a fair use case, a user
asserts the right to use a work without seeking

51

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“The ‘Progress of
Science,’petitioners acknowledge, refers broadly to ‘the creation and spread
of knowledge and learning.’”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212
n.18 (2003) (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)), aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (C.A.2 1994) (“Accordingly, ‘copyright law
celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the
exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in
the proliferation of knowledge . . . . The profit motive is the engine that
ensures the progress of science.’”).
53
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52
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permission or paying a fee; the copyright owner claims
that such a use is infringement. The user’s case asserts
the primacy of the dissemination of knowledge or the
“Progress of Science,” while the copyright owner
emphasizes the “exclusive Rights” granted by copyright.
Fair use cases determine, on the facts before the court,
which purpose shall prevail.
Fair use is thus a potentially powerful antidote to the
rights that belong to the copyright owner. Fair use is
appropriation artists’ best hope for escaping liability. It
is no surprise, then, that most of the scholarly
discussion over the application of copyright law to
appropriation art has focused on the application of the
fair use doctrine. Indeed, of the various approaches that
might be used, fair use is the only one that has been
applied by courts.54
The next part of this article will consider the rise of
transformativeness in the law of fair use to see if the
trend in the cases since 1997 is less oppressive to art
than it was previously. If so, then perhaps the
difficulties besetting appropriation artists have been
mitigated.

IV. FAIR USE AND APPROPRIATION ART
The law of fair use was first codified in the United
States when the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed.
Section 107 lays out the defense:
Notwithstanding
the
provisions
of
sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by

54
My 1997 article described some other possibilities, some of which
had been suggested by contemporary commentators, including
compulsory license and the unlikely expedient of abandoning copyright
altogether. See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 271–75.
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reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement
of
copyright.
In
determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall
include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted
work.55
Although the four factors listed are non-exclusive,
each must be included in the fair use analysis.56 In the
case law interpreting section 107, two factors stand out
as the most important: the purpose and character of the
use (factor one),57 and the market impact of the use on
55
Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 17, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
56
Id. (“[T]he factors to be considered shall include . . . .”) (emphasis
added). In other words, consideration of the factors stated in section 107 is
mandatory (“shall”); also, the factors are non-exclusive (“include”).
57
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994);
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW
OF COPYRIGHT 68 (Columbia University Press 1967); Pierre Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
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the market for the copied work (factor four).58 A heavy
market impact (for example, the defendant selling her
works in direct competition with the plaintiff) tends to
weigh against fair use; light or no impact, in favor of fair
use.59

A. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first of the key factors—the “purpose and
character” of the use—has evolved over the Act’s first
thirty-six years. 60 The Act states that in determining
“purpose and character,” a court must address “whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes.” 61 Predictably, then, the early
cases focused on whether the use was commercial or
not.62
But the purpose and character of the use can
obviously be more complicated than simply whether
the use is commercial or not. In 1990, then-District
Judge Pierre N. Leval wrote an article in the Harvard
Law Review that dynamited the notion that the purpose

58
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590–94; Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“This . . . factor is
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”); Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1997); Leval, supra note 57.
59
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 603.
60
See An Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). The Copyright Act of 1976 became effective
in 1978, 36 years before this article was written. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West,
Westlaw through 2014).
61
17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1).
62
See Harper & Row Publishers., Inc., 471 U.S. at 562 (“The fact that a
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor
that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.” ); Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451
(“[E]very commercial use . . . is presumptively . . . unfair”). Ten years after
Sony, however, the Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose noted that “the mere fact
that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a
finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of a use
bars a finding of fairness.” 510 U.S. at 584.
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and character of the use was mostly about
commerciality.63 Leval’s seminal article argued instead
that analysis of the purpose and character of the use
should focus on whether the use was transformative. By
transforming the prior work, the later artist adds
something creative, which justifies the copying. 64
Judge Leval’s article laid the foundation for the
analysis of transformation in fair use. But it was the
Supreme Court’s explicit approval in Campbell 65 that
transformed Leval’s idea into law. 66 The Campbell court
described the purpose of analysis under the first fair use
factor as determining “whether the new work merely
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation,” 67 or
whether the use “adds something new, with a different
purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message . . . in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative.’” 68 After Campbell, transformation was
at the heart of fair use.
How does a court determine whether a use is
transformative? One obvious approach is to assess the
changes made to the original work by the secondary

63
Leval, supra note 57, at 1116 n.53 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982))(“The
interpretation of the first factor is complicated by the mention in the statute
of a distinction based on ‘whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes.’ One should not exaggerate the
importance of this distinction.”).
64
See id. at 1111.
65
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994) (“I
believe the answer to the question of justification [of fair use] turns
primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is
transformative. The use must be product and must employ the quoted
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”).
66
Id. at 579.
67
Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4,901)).
68
Id. (citing Leval, supra note 57, at 1111).
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user.69 But courts have also considered the context in
which the original work appears in the secondary
work. 70 More broadly, the “composition, presentation,
scale, color palette, and media” of the secondary work,
as well as its “expressive nature”71 (compared with the
original) could be seen as transformative.
Most broadly, each author’s purpose in creating
work is important to determining transformation, and
thus, fair use. 72 Even if the second work is not
transformative, the use may be fair if the author’s
purpose is transformative. Thus, the creation of images
much smaller than the originals (“thumbnails”) used for
internet navigation, but not otherwise transformative,
has been found to be a fair use of the original works. 73
Transformation has also influenced the way in
which courts approach other aspects of the defendant’s
use. For example, transformation can mitigate the
negative impact of a commercial use. 74 On the other
hand, lack of transformation may have the opposite
effect, increasing the weight given to such evidence. 75

69
E.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Kienitz v.
Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d on
other grounds, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
70
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir.
2003).
71
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 618, (2013).
72
Blanch , 467 F.3d at 253; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 706 (2d Cir. 2006); Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, 575 F.
Supp. 513, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
73
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir.
2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).
74
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th
Cir. 2001).
75
See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001).
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Important as it is, however, transformation has not
superseded the other fair use factors. 76 It is just one
aspect, albeit the most important aspect, of the first
factor (the “purpose and character of the use”). 77 The
“purpose and character of the use” also depends on
whether the use is commercial or for nonprofit
educational purposes, in bad faith, or parody.78 Parody
holds a privileged status among kinds of use because
permission to create parodies is rarely given, and they
are frequently created for profit, hence commercial. 79
Before the rise of transformativeness, defendants often
claimed that their work was a parody in an attempt to
escape sanctions in a copyright case. 80 Thus, in the first
infringement lawsuits against Jeff Koons, which took
place before transformation was widely acknowledged
as an important element, Koons claimed that his work
was parody, as that was the clearest route to winning a
fair use case for the defendant. 81 For Koons, the parody

76
See id. at 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Although
such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use,
the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”).
77
See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)) (“The heart of the fair use inquiry is
into the first specified statutory factor identified as ‘the purpose and
character of the use.’”).
78
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992).
79
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 596–600 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the opinion emphasized that
a legitimate parody must target or comment on the original work, using
humor. Id. at 597. It is not enough that the work use the original to
comment on things other than the original, for example society at large or
the genre of art to which the original belongs. Id. at 599. Kennedy
characterized such broader works as “satire,” rather than “parody,” and
found them less deserving of fair use because the need to copy is less than it
is when creating a parody. Id. at 597.
80
See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.
1980).
81
See generally Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (1990).
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defense was conspicuously unsuccessful. 82 Nevertheless,
parody is still mentioned in appropriation art cases,
usually in conjunction with transformation.83

B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor under section 107 is the nature of
the copyrighted (that is, the copied) 84 work. 85 Courts
generally consider whether the copied work is a work of
imagination or the arts (which cuts against fair use), or
whether it is more fact-based (which tends to cut in
favor of fair use).86 Imaginative and artistic works are
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
fact-based works, with the consequence that fair use is
more difficult to establish when the former works are
copied.87
Many works of appropriation art copy expressive
works, which are close to the core of copyright
protection. We might expect that courts would weigh
that factor against fair use in appropriation art cases,
and so they did, before Campbell. 88 As transformation
has become a crucial concept in fair use, however, the

82
See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310; United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons,
817 F.Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v. Koons, 91 CIV. 6055 (RO)),
1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993).
83
This was the case in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. 510 U.S. at 599; see also
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir.
2003); Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (W.D.
Wis. 2013), aff’d, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
84
The Act uses the term “the copyrighted work” to refer to the work
from which the user copied. The work to which the user copied is simply
referred to as the “use.” If the use is fair, then both works are copyrighted.
85
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012).
86
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569.
87
Id. at 586 (Souter, J., majority opinion). The distinction is of less use
in a parody case, as parodies seem inevitably to “copy publicly known,
expressive works.” Id.
88
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons 817 F. Supp. 370, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

141

FAIR USE AND APPROPRIATION ART

[6:121 2015]

significance of the second factor—the nature of the
copyrighted work—seemed to decline. The Second
Circuit has held that when the use is transformative, the
second factor will not be given much weight. 89 The
Ninth Circuit has taken this a step further and held that
“the more transformative the new work, the less will be
the significance of other factors.” 90 The Second Circuit’s
recent appropriation art case, Cariou v. Prince, is in
accord.91

C. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third statutory fair use factor—the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole—disfavors extensive
copying and favors uses that appropriate relatively little
from their sources. No court has ever attempted a
bright-line rule about how much can be taken. It is
clear, though, that “how much” depends on “what for”—
that is, how much may be taken depends on the use to
be made of the materials (which is factor one).92 The
artist is not limited to taking only what is necessary. 93
The Supreme Court has found that copying an entire
work was fair use when the use consisted of videotaping
broadcast television programs for home, non-

89
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
618 (2013); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding that even under the best of circumstances, the second factor was
“rarely determinative.”).
90
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S.
at 586 (A similar de-emphasis of this factor has happened in parody cases,
in which the second factor is not weighed heavily because “parodies almost
invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”).
91
714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013)
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579).
92
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 589.
93
Id. at 588.
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commercial use,94 but all other things being equal, the
more that is copied, the less likely a finding of fair use.95
Like the other factors, the third factor seems to have
diminished in importance with the ascendancy of
“transformation” in fair use analysis. 96 The inquiry
regarding “transformation” may have completely
subsumed this factor, much as it appears to have
subsumed the second factor. That is, if the use is highly
transformative, the fact that a lot was copied from the
original work will not deter a finding of fair use; in fact,
sufficient transformation has led some courts to
conclude that this factor weighed in favor of fair use—
even when the whole underlying work has been
copied.97

D. Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market
In 1985, the Supreme Court stated that this factor
was “undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use.”98 It requires courts to consider not only the
extent of market harm caused by the particular actions
of the alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the
94

(1984).

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496

95
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564
(1985); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001); Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v.
Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). But see Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3d 244, 246, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (copying entire work does not rule out fair
use).
96
The Second and Ninth Circuits have said the importance of the
other factors declines when transformation is found. See supra text
accompanying notes 86-93.
97
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618
(2013); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d
Cir. 2006); Mattell, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.
2003).
98
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.., 471 U.S. at 566.
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defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse
impact on the potential market” for the original. 99 The
kind of market harm cognizable under this factor is the
harm caused by the new work’s substitution for the old
work in the market. 100 It is not the suppression of
demand for the original work that matters, it is
usurpation of the demand for the original work.101
Impact on the market for derivative works may also
be considered. Courts have not been very consistent in
the analysis of derivative works in this regard. 102 Some
courts, taking their cue from the cases before them,
simply state that it is obviously possible that someone
else might seek to do the very thing done by the
defendant but in exchange for payment of a license
fee.103 This kind of judicial speculation inevitably leads
to the conclusion that the fourth factor cuts against fair
use—one can always imagine the defendant paying for
her use. However, when there is evidence of a market
for derivative works—similar to the one created by the
defendant—and that market would be adversely
affected if the derivative use were to become
widespread, then a market impact can be shown. 104

99
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting 3 M.
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05 (1993)).
100
Id. at 570–71.
101
Id. (finding that most parodies easily pass muster because it is a rare
parody that can substitute for the original in the marketplace). But see
Benny v. Loew’s, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) (stating a concern that a
parody of the movie Gas Light might adversely impact the market for the
movie—although this case preceded the 1976 Act, and therefore did not
consider the factors provided therein).
102
1 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright § 5:171 (2014).
103
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992).
104
Compare United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (market for sculptures in the shape of a cartoon dog
plausible) with Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th
Cir. 2003) (market for “adult-oriented artistic photographs of Barbie” doll
not plausible).
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In today’s market for appropriation art, impact on
the plaintiff’s market is usually negligible. Although
one could always speculate that a third party might
offer a fee in exchange for the right to create a
derivative work like the defendant’s, in the absence of
such a market or plans to create such a market, a court
should ignore such speculation.
Moreover, as a
practical matter, the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
works are often not sold in the same market.105 Hence,
the defendant’s work cannot substitute for the
plaintiff’s. When the audiences, the purchasers, and the
prices are different for the two works, it is unlikely that
there would be a market impact on the plaintiff. 106 But,
because one can imagine copying that does not match
this description, analysis of the market impact of the
copying continues to be important in appropriation art
cases.107

V. MODEST PROPOSAL
The fair use landscape has been transformed by
transformation. The rise of transformation analysis,
based on Judge Leval’s article, is nothing short of
remarkable. It has affected fair use in nearly every
context in which fair use can be found. 108 When

105
See e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
106
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).
107
For example, someone might copy a piece of popular, massproduced art, and sell a large number of copies at about the same price as
the original. In such a case, the fact that the copies might be called “art”
should not shield the user from a claim of infringement.
The
appropriation art cases to date, however, involve what we might think of as
“gallery art” and do not involve mass production of copies.
108
Not every fair use case addresses transformation. A study of fair use
judicial opinions up to 2005 found that, after Campbell, more than 41% of
district court opinions, and nearly 19% of circuit court opinions, did not
mention transformation. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S.
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transformation is found, the outcome is nearly always a
finding of fair use.109
We would expect, then, that appropriation art has
benefited from the addition of transformation to the
fair use analysis. Indeed, it has: the appropriation art
cases won by the defendant (i.e., the artist) since
Campbell were won because of the defendant’s
“transformation” of the underlying work.110 That must
be seen as progress: Pre-Campbell, no appropriation
artist had won a case, while post-Campbell there have to
date been three wins for appropriation art.111
Even with transformation, however, fair use is no
panacea for appropriation artists. To be sure, most
appropriation art strives to be transformative. It seeks to
evoke a different response in the viewer than did the
original. But, judges can be unpredictable; they might
not find the work to be transformative, or even insert
some other limit—for example that the degree of
copying exceeded the judge’s notion of what is
necessary for the artist’s purpose, even if the use is
transformative.112

Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 604–05 (2008).
Nearly 37% of the 68 post-Campbell opinions finding fair use did not
mention transformation. See id. at 605. The analyzed cases are current only
through 2005, however, and it is possible that the cases since then have
increasingly taken up the idea of transformation.
109
See Beebe, supra note 108, at 606.
110
See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710; Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253, 256–
57, 259 (2d Cir. 2006); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 806, 811.
111
See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d 694; Blanch, 467 F.3d 244; Mattel, 353 F.3d
792.
112
E.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 544
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A finding of verbatim copying in excess of what is
reasonably necessary diminishes a finding of a transformative use.”). The
idea that a judge, lacking any training, experience, or other qualification,
would second-guess what was “necessary” to achieve the artist’s purpose is
dismaying, and disregards Justice Holmes’ famous admonishment that “[i]t
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Worse yet for the artist, fair use is an affirmative
defense, 113 which can be established only by litigating
the question of infringement. It is usually litigated after
the plaintiff has made at least a prima facie case of
infringement because if infringement cannot be
established, there is no need for an affirmative
defense. 114 From an academic perspective, this may
seem to pose no problem. After all, judicial opinions are
an important component of the law that we study. But,
a practitioner should immediately see the problem:
copyright litigation is expensive. 115 Telling artists that
they have the right to make fair use of others’ works as
long as they are willing to litigate the matter is telling
them that they have all the rights they can afford to
buy. To allocate the right to create art according to the
financial resources of the artist is extravagantly
protective of existing work at the expense of new work.
The public interest, too, is damaged by applying
copyright law to suppress appropriation art. 116
Copyright’s primary purpose is to increase access to
copyrighted works. 117 Secondarily, it creates incentives
for authors to create.118 If an author’s incentives are not
damaged by a use, then, all other things being equal,
copyright should not prohibit the use. 119 Yet, the

would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
113
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
114
See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
115
Professor Litman refers to it as “hideously expensive.” JESSICA
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 183 (Prometheus Books 2001).
116
See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 263–65.
117
Id. at 263.
118
Id. at 260.
119
Id. at 264
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mechanism for balancing those interests, fair use, is so
costly that for artists it is inadequate.
A solution exists that would allow a court to limit the
damage to the public interest without damaging the
authors’ incentive. It is both workable and practical. Of
course, it would be opposed, but even the opponents
would find it hard to argue that it would cause harm.120
Courts could accomplish this by recognizing that a
use that fits the definition of a “work of visual art,” as
defined in the Copyright Act,121 is highly likely to be a
fair use. The court would evaluate transformativeness,
but also should look at harm to the market. In this
regard, it is hard to imagine a work of visual art
120
One fear might be that such a proposal could lead to an industry of
so-called “artists” making “appropriation art” based on high-value existing
works, selling the copies as if they were the originals. In other words,
favoring appropriation art might promote widespread art fraud. But, the art
world is already familiar with the problem of fraud, and it is a criminal
matter. Any connection between copyright rules and art fraud is pure
speculation. For their part, copyright owners might prefer that all uses of
their works, whether harmful or not, be left to their discretion. But the
question is not which rule copyright owners would favor; rather, it is which
rule is most in the public interest.
121
A “work of visual art” is (1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,
existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer
that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or
other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic image
produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is
signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author. A work of visual art
does not include—(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing,
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work,
book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information
service, electronic publication, or similar publication; (ii) any
merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or
packaging material or container; (iii) any portion or part of any item
described in clause (i) or (ii); (B) any work made for hire; or (C) any work
not subject to copyright protection under this title. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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harming the market for more commercialized works
because “works of visual art” can exist only in two
hundred or fewer copies, signed and consecutively
numbered. The market for such works is relatively
small, and it consists of purchasers who are generally
sophisticated and knowledgeable about what they are
purchasing. Buyers in this market are familiar with the
practice of selling copies of works; they are called
“reproductions.” There are generally at least two
differences between a reproduction and a work of
appropriation art: First, appropriation art itself is
attributed to an artist, different from the artist who
created the original work, whereas reproductions are
uncredited. Second, the intention of the appropriation
artist is different from that of the creator of the original
work, while reproductions seek to simulate the presence
of the original work. Attribution is enough to take care
of most of the potential problems that copying might
create. For example, Sherri Levine’s photographs of
photographs taken by Edward Weston would not
compete in the art market with the Weston originals:
Levine’s practice of naming those works After Edward
Weston and signing her works would take care of that.

VI. CONCLUSION
Appropriation art is a legitimate and long-standing
art form practiced by many twentieth- and twenty-first
century artists. Copyright law, which is intended to
promote access to creative works, has struggled to come
to grips with appropriation art because this kind of art
uses preexisting works as its subject material; it
comments on culture using the icons of culture.
Because appropriation art copies without the
permission of the copyright holder, copyright law tends
to sweep it into the category of infringement. However,
unlike most copying, appropriation art does not raise

149

FAIR USE AND APPROPRIATION ART

[6:121 2015]

the problems of unauthorized exploitation
usurpation of the market for the original.

and

A relatively easy solution is available. Courts should
recognize the legitimacy of appropriation art as an
artistic practice and take account of the lack of danger
to existing art markets posed by appropriation artists, as
long as the copying takes the form of a “work of visual
art” as defined in the Copyright Act. The common
characteristics of such works, described in this
definition, are enough to assure that no significant
harm can result from the practice. That lack of harm
together with the primary purpose of copyright—to
increase access to creative works—are enough to suggest
that appropriation artists should win all or nearly all the
infringement cases brought against them.

